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3Everyone is well aware that the impressive unity 
shown by the 27 during the Article 50 process will be 
under greater strain when it comes to the future trade 
negotiation with Britain. For the EU, therefore, the 
Political Declaration is only the first stab at the mandate 
that will be issued by the European Council to the 
Commission for the conduct of the negotiation of the 
association agreement. Drafting the heads of agreement 
of the future treaty between 27 nervous member states 
and a chaotic British state has been a delicate business. 
The draft Declaration had to reflect both the guidelines 
for the Article 50 process set by the European Council 
and the red lines of the British government. The former 
were defensive and technocratic while the latter were 
narrow and negative. 
Although both sides have shifted position, most 
obviously since the Chequers agreement in July, 
divergence between the two parties has limited the 
fluency and utility of the Declaration.3 Produced without 
public consultation, the document has been criticised 
In dogged pursuit of her deal, Theresa May continues 
to try to win over some Brexiteer MPs to ratify the 
Withdrawal Agreement. Nobody else believes she can 
do this. We all may be wrong: the prime minister is 
evidently a remarkable woman. 
She is also very stubborn. She refuses to accept what 
the leaders of the European Union tell her — namely, 
that they will not allow the British to guillotine the 
Irish Protocol or to modify its terms unilaterally. The 
Irish backstop is a temporary device due to remain 
“unless and until” something better comes along. 
The EU is mightily puzzled by the British obsession 
with the backstop — which, after all, were it ever to 
be implemented, would put Northern Ireland into a 
uniquely privileged partnership with the EU. 
Pro-European MPs would do well to ask 
themselves, if the Withdrawal Agreement 
is really such a bad deal, why the Brexiteers 
are so determined to destroy it.
The prime minister’s last-ditch tactics are truly 
bewildering. The arch-Brexiteers whom she targets are 
only a quixotic minority in the Commons. Most MPs 
are not Brexiteers but dejected Remainers, anxious 
to respect the result of the 2016 referendum but 
determined not to burn all bridges with Europe. 
The prime minister should focus her efforts 
on winning greater clarity and reassurance 
about the long-term future relationship as 
set out in the Political Declaration.
Fearing no deal above all, this large but leaderless cohort 
is surely persuadable that the package deal on offer from 
the EU — the only one available — should be supported. 
Pro-European MPs would do well to ask themselves, 
if the Withdrawal Agreement is really such a bad deal, 
why the Brexiteers are so determined to destroy it. 
Disappointed Remainers should tell Mrs May that the 
more she concedes to the anti-Europeans, the less likely 
it is that Pro-Europeans will back her deal. 
The prime minister should focus her efforts on 
winning greater clarity and reassurance about the 
long-term future relationship as set out in the Political 
Declaration. While the EU refuses, quite rightly, to 
reopen the Withdrawal Agreement and the  
backstop, it would be willing, on receipt of a decent 
proposal from London, to reconsider aspects of the 
Political Declaration.
The Political Declaration
Published in its full version on 22 November, the  
36-page document is a curious beast.1 Its purpose  
is to hold the UK and the EU 27 to the negotiation 
of a new association agreement that will govern 
comprehensively their future unique and  
special partnership. 
Neither party, to be frank, has been sufficiently well 
prepared for this exercise: the UK, as we see, has  
had no settled view about what it wants after Brexit,  
and the EU side has managed to evade a deep reflection 
on the future of Europe without the Brits. 
Article 50(2) TEU says merely that the arrangements 
for Britain’s withdrawal from the Union shall be drawn 
up “taking account of the framework for its future 
relationship”. But setting out that framework must 
not pre-empt the actual negotiation of the association 
agreement, which must be undertaken, as far as the EU 
is concerned, under a different legal base, in accordance 
with a different procedure, and only after the UK has 
actually left the Union.2
4THE BASICS
We read that the Declaration “establishes the 
parameters of an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible 
partnership across trade and economic cooperation, 
law enforcement and criminal justice, foreign policy, 
security and defence and wider areas of cooperation.”6
“The future relationship will be based on a 
balance of rights and obligations, taking into 
account the principles of each Party. This balance 
must ensure the autonomy of the Union’s 
decision making and be consistent with the 
Union’s principles, in particular with respect 
to the integrity of the Single Market and the 
Customs Union and the indivisibility of the four 
freedoms. It must also ensure the sovereignty 
of the United Kingdom and the protection of its 
internal market, while respecting the result of 
the 2016 referendum including with regard to the 
In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the 
European Council of 13-14 December evinced its lost 
confidence in Theresa May. Beyond a short statement 
on the importance of continuing the Brexit process, 
and of intensifying preparations for no deal, President 
Tusk says he has no mandate to negotiate further with 
the British.5 “The Union stands by this agreement and 
intends to proceed with its ratification. It is not open 
for renegotiation”. He added, nonetheless, that “we are 
ready to discuss how to facilitate UK ratification”. 
So what changes to the (famously ‘non-binding’) 
Political Declaration would be at once acceptable to 
the EU and serve to ratify the Withdrawal Agreement 
in Britain? How can the document be improved to 
overcome misunderstandings about its purpose and to 
meet some of the stated objections to it? 
Here are some proposals for a judicious tweaking of  
the document. 
variously in the British parliament and media for being 
incomplete, ambiguous — and too short as well as too 
long. It seems to have suited everyone in London to 
dismiss the Declaration as ‘non-binding’ blah-blah. 
The only way MPs can block no deal is 
by doing a deal. Otherwise, the EU will 
continue to fast-track its own contingency 
plans to pull out of the UK on 29 March.
Brexiteers dislike the Political Declaration because it 
postulates a close permanent association with the EU. 
Remainers have largely ignored it and instead have 
taken to quarrelling among themselves about other 
supposed models for the future relationship — ‘Norway 
for now’, ‘Norway +++’, Switzerland and even Turkey.
Amid the confusion, the delusion has grown that  
all MPs have to do to prevent the UK from crashing  
out without a deal is to say so. That is not true.  
The only way MPs can block no deal is by doing a  
deal. Otherwise, the EU will continue to fast-track  
its own contingency plans to pull out of the UK  
on 29 March.4
As the threat of no deal grows, therefore, it is  
not just the Conservative government which provokes 
dismay in Brussels. Although the Labour party’s  
Brexit policy is even at this late stage a work in  
progress, its first pitch would seem to involve permanent 
full membership of the EU customs union somehow 
coupled with only partial adherence to the common 
commercial policy. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn agrees 
with the prime minister that Brexit means leaving 
the single market and stopping freedom of movement 
of people. He also opposes EU state-aid rules and 
competition policy. 
It is a pity that the opposition parties at Westminster 
have failed to recognise that the Political Declaration is 
essentially permissive, allowing for a broad spectrum of 
different outcomes, including a free trade agreement, 
participation in the single market and membership 
of a customs union. The EU continues to repeat that 
it stands ready to adapt its own position as and when 
British red lines soften. As the Political Declaration 
makes clear, the strength of the future economic 
partnership rests entirely on the extent to which  
the UK is ready to respect the EU acquis.  
The Political Declaration is essentially 
permissive, allowing for a broad spectrum 
of different outcomes, including a free 
trade agreement, participation in the 
single market and membership of a 
customs union.
The document also spells out how close political 
cooperation can be achieved in non-economic fields, 
and establishes a coherent system of joint governance, 
based on the model of the Ukraine Association 
Agreement, that neither Norway or Switzerland enjoys. 
The Political Declaration deserves a better press.
Improving the Political Declaration
5development of its independent trade policy and 
the ending of free movement of people between the 
Union and the United Kingdom.”7
Removal of the last phrase (italicised) would indicate 
at once that the UK was prepared to soften its previous 
red lines in the knowledge, first, that it is less likely to 
be able to strike the global trade bargains that it had 
once claimed were possible, and, second, that the British 
labour market will continue to require a sustained 
mobile workforce of EU citizens.  
The EU now agrees to keep the whole of 
the UK within the customs territory of 
the EU at least until the new association 
agreement enters into force. To return the 
compliment, the UK should now drop the 
reference in the Political Declaration to its 
former red lines.
Only Brexiteers, it seems, still cling to illusions of 
pristine independence and national self-sufficiency: 
even the prime minister, for whom reducing immigration 
remains an important objective, has been listening to 
business anxieties about British exclusion from the 
EU’s customs union and to business needs with regard 
to employment. In a major concession after Chequers, 
the EU now agrees to keep the whole of the UK within 
the customs territory of the EU at least until the new 
association agreement enters into force. To return the 
compliment, the UK should now drop the reference in 
the Political Declaration to its former red lines. 
IRISH BACKSTOP
The Political Declaration affirms the intention to replace 
the Irish backstop with a permanent solution which 
avoids a hard border.8 But the language used is less clear 
than that of the Withdrawal Agreement. It would be 
helpful if the more forceful language about the backstop 
chosen for the European Council conclusions of  
13 December could be adopted in the relevant  
passages of the Declaration:  
It would be helpful if the more forceful 
language about the backstop chosen for  
the European Council conclusions of  
13 December could be adopted in the 
relevant passages of the Declaration.
 
“3. The European Council underlines that the 
backstop is intended as an insurance policy to 
prevent a hard border on the island of Ireland and 
ensure the integrity of the Single Market. It is the 
Union’s firm determination to work speedily on a 
subsequent agreement that establishes by  
31 December 2020 alternative arrangements, so 
that the backstop will not need to be triggered. 
“4. The European Council also underlines that, if 
the backstop were nevertheless to be triggered, 
it would apply temporarily, unless and until it 
is superseded by a subsequent agreement that 
ensures that a hard border is avoided. In such a 
case, the Union would use its best endeavours 
to negotiate and conclude expeditiously a 
subsequent agreement that would replace the 
backstop, and would expect the same of the 
United Kingdom, so that the backstop would only 
be in place for as long as strictly necessary.”  
MOBILITY
In drafting the Political Declaration, the two sides  
found it most difficult to agree on the matter of 
movement of EU citizens to Britain. Under instruction 
from 10 Downing Street, British officials ceded very 
little. The chapter of the document on mobility makes 
for bleak reading.9 Predicated on the UK’s decision to 
suppress the principle of free movement of persons, it 
was agreed that future mobility arrangements would 
be based on full reciprocity and national discretion. 
The two merely “agree to consider” terms for student 
exchange and the coordination of social security, and to 
“explore options” for judicial cooperation. 
“In line with their applicable laws, the Parties  
will explore the possibility to facilitate the crossing 
of their respective borders for legitimate travel”. 
In short, post-Brexit Britain would treat EU citizens  
like third-country aliens. This implies a regression  
from the arrangements struck in the Withdrawal 
Agreement for EU citizens resident in Britain and  
British citizens resident in the EU 27, under which, 
during the transition period and after, existing citizens’ 
rights will be largely protected. It is ironic that all  
this was drafted into the Political Declaration just  
at the time when it became clear that net migration 
from the EU to the UK has dropped steeply since the 
Brexit referendum. Today, more EU citizens are  
leaving Britain than arriving.10
This section of the document should be entirely 
rewritten. It could refer to the contribution made  
over the years by mobile workers and their families to 
the productivity of the EU’s open social market  
economy and to its cultural enrichment. The stated 
objective should be to manage migration at  
sustainable levels, to promote travel for study and 
tourism, and to facilitate migration for business  
and employment. 
On 19 December the British government published a 
long-awaited White Paper on immigration which  
seems to indicate a softening of Mrs May’s previous  
hard line. Quotas are dropped. There will be  
6twelve-month ‘transitional visas’ for EU job-seekers  
of all skills. It is important that the Political Declaration 
reflects the government’s latest, apparently more  
liberal approach.11  
 
SERVICES
Relaxation of the Political Declaration on the movement 
of people would immediately open the way for a 
real improvement to the section on services.12 The 
Declaration speaks warmly of concluding “ambitious, 
comprehensive and balanced arrangements”,  
delivering a “level of liberalisation in trade in services 
well beyond” WTO standards. But such ambition  
is not substantiated by concrete commitments to 
maintain regulatory alignment in the services and 
investment sectors of the economy. Here the EU 
can be more generous to the UK in return for more 
British generosity over migration: service providers 
and investors are people, very often mobile. Another 
improvement could be made in the section on financial 
services if the UK were to permit a reference to the 
banking union. 
Relaxation of the Political Declaration 
on the movement of people would 
immediately open the way for a real 
improvement to the section on services.
The Declaration can afford to be more forthcoming 
on the matter of regulation. Although it speaks of 
establishing “a framework for voluntary regulatory 
cooperation in areas of mutual interest”, little is said of 
the need for the British state to erect a new apparatus 
of regulators to compensate for the loss of the EU 
regulatory framework across almost all spheres  
of the economy. These new home-grown regulators 
must be independent of ministerial control, open to 
stakeholders and equipped to engage with the  
European Commission on the verification of  
equivalence with EU norms. The two parties “agree  
that close and structured cooperation on regulatory  
and supervisory matters is in their mutual interest”.  
Having willed the ends, they should will the ways  
and means. 
GOODS
The Declaration is on firmer ground when dealing  
with trade in goods.13 The two sides want “a  
trading relationship on goods that is as close as 
possible” — a free trade area “combining deep  
regulatory and customs cooperation, underpinned  
by provisions ensuring a level playing field for open  
and fair competition”. The economic partnership  
will “build and improve on the single customs  
territory provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement”. 
(One wonders if anyone in the Labour party has  
read this.) 
Understandably, the EU is keen not to open the  
door to wholesale British freeriding on the back of its 
trade and professional agencies. It is agreed that  
the two sides will “explore the possibility of cooperation 
of the UK authorities with Union agencies such as the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European 
Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA)”. But this is an inadequate  
response to the obvious need for British associate 
membership (without voting rights) of up to thirty EU 
bodies relevant to the smooth operation of a deep and 
comprehensive free trade area, including those that 
regulate (Labour should note) workers’ and consumer 
rights and environmental protection.  
LANGUAGE
The language of much of the Declaration often fails to 
emit a sufficiently strong sense of commitment to the 
conclusion of the future partnership treaty. A thorough 
edit would usefully provide greater clarity and bring 
momentum to the impending negotiations. For example, 
“in this context, the UK will consider aligning with 
Union rules in relevant areas” would be better rendered, 
without subverting the intention, as “will align with”. 
There are many similar instances in the document where 
“may” can be replaced by “should”, and others where 
“could” or “should” ought to be replaced by “will”.14
Scrapping tentative and conditional tenses and adopting 
more affirmative and imperative language can be 
achieved skilfully without predetermining the outcome 
of the negotiation. It would also help Mrs May. Injecting 
a dose of optimism into this Brexit business would be no 
bad thing.  
The language of much of the Declaration 
often fails to emit a sufficiently strong 
sense of commitment to the conclusion of 
the future partnership treaty.
 
SECURITY
The chapters on the security partnership evince more 
confidence, not least because the EU is happy to 
recognise the value of the UK’s continuing contribution 
in this field. One lapse that needs to be addressed, 
however, is the negligent sentence which reads:
“The Parties should consider appropriate 
arrangements for cooperation on space.”15
Indeed, they can and must. 
It would also be useful for British purposes to 
repeat what the Withdrawal Agreement says about 
7the possibility of reaching an early agreement on 
security and defence policy, and of bringing such new 
arrangements into force on a provisional basis before 
the full, comprehensive treaty on trade is concluded.16 
GOVERNANCE
Clearest of all is the section on governance, where, 
building on the transitional arrangements under the 
Withdrawal Agreement, robust joint institutions are 
envisaged of a political, technical and judicial nature. 
The future EU-UK partnership is conceived as a dynamic 
one, with the possibility of “review and development  
over time”.17 The EU is ready to concede to the UK more 
joint ownership of the future governance arrangements 
than it has granted any other associated state, not 
excluding Norway. 
The EU is ready to concede to the UK more 
joint ownership of the future governance 
arrangements than it has granted any other 
associated state, not excluding Norway.
The legal standing of the Declaration
The Declaration will accompany the Withdrawal 
Agreement without being annexed to it. The  
Preamble to the Agreement notes “in parallel with  
this Agreement, the Parties have made a Political 
Declaration setting out the framework for the future 
relationship between the European Union and the 
United Kingdom”. Article 184 of the Agreement says:
“The Union and the United Kingdom shall use 
their best endeavours, in good faith and in full 
respect of their respective legal orders, to take 
the necessary steps to negotiate expeditiously the 
agreements governing their future relationship 
referred to in the political declaration of  
25 November 2018 and to conduct the relevant 
procedures for the ratification or conclusion of 
those agreements, with a view to ensuring that 
those agreements apply, to the extent possible,  
as from the end of the transition period.” 
The Declaration is politically binding  
on both parties as they head on to 
negotiate the future trade and security 
treaty after Brexit.
Paragraph 138 of the Declaration adds ambitiously:
“In setting out the framework of the future 
relationship between the Union and the UK, this 
declaration confirms, as set out in the Withdrawal 
Agreement, that it is the clear intent of both 
Parties to develop in good faith agreements 
giving effect to this relationship and to begin  
the formal process of negotiations as soon  
as possible after the UK’s withdrawal from the 
Union, such that they can come into force by  
the end of 2020”.
It is accepted that the Declaration is politically binding 
on both parties as they head on to negotiate the future 
trade and security treaty after Brexit. The document is 
an indispensable adjunct to the Withdrawal Agreement 
and is cross-referenced. If the Declaration has to be 
changed later, a revision could only be enacted by a 
European Council decision of equal weight to the one 
which launched it in the first place.  
The document can be regarded as a 
measure of EU soft law, the breaching 
of which would have serious political 
consequences for both parties.
Mrs May asked the December European Council to 
upgrade the legal status of the Political Declaration to 
make it binding. It was explained to her why this  
is not possible under EU law. Nevertheless, the  
prime minister has a point. The document can be 
regarded as a measure of EU soft law, the breaching  
of which would have serious political consequences  
for both parties. In the event of any litigation, the 
European Court of Justice would be bound to have 
cognisance of it. 
In a gesture towards the British, the EU should now 
agree to accord the Political Declaration formal 
recognition in the preamble to the Council decision  
that is required under Article 50(2) to conclude the 
whole legal process of British secession from the  
Union.18 The British and European Parliaments should 
follow suit when they come separately to ratify the 
package deal.
8The Political Declaration has many merits and has been 
unfairly criticised by Remainers. We have suggested some 
modest amendments here to enhance its standing and to 
strengthen its purpose in securing a closer association 
between the EU and its former member state. 
The Declaration identifies Britain’s future landing zone 
as an association agreement that borrows elements 
from comparable agreements with other third countries 
but improves upon them. It builds without disruption 
on the continuity and transitional arrangements of the 
Withdrawal Agreement. It should minimise conflicts over 
the long term between the EU 27 and the UK. Its joint 
governance facilitates dynamic developments — even 
healing at least some of the wounds inflicted by Brexit.
The very vagueness of the Political Declaration was 
useful for both sides when they had yet to make up their 
minds about what kind of mutual relationship they were 
really seeking. Its flexibility and broad scope allow for 
a spectrum of different outcomes in terms of economic 
and security partnerships that can deepen and widen 
over time. 
However, now that the Brexit process nears its climax and 
both parties have a better understanding of the nature of 
their future partnership, the Political Declaration should 
be enhanced in order to give their negotiators a more 
certain steer. We propose here amendments that would, 
in particular, by modifying Theresa May’s red lines serve 
to open up UK EU trade in services.  
If the British parliament wishes to 
take back control of Brexit, proposing 
amendments to the Declaration is a good 
way to start.
The House of Commons is to have its first ‘meaningful 
vote’, at last, on 15 January. Amending the Political 
Declaration may not be the only way to convince MPs 
to ratify the Withdrawal Agreement and avoid no deal. 
But improving the document is a good thing to do in its 
own right. And if the British parliament wishes to take 
back control of Brexit, proposing amendments to the 
Declaration is a good way to start.
A closer association
91 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/political-declaration-setting-
out-framework-future-relationship-between-european-union-and-united-
kingdom_en
2 Article 217 and 218 TFEU, respectively. 
3 At Chequers the cabinet decided on a regulatory paradigm for future 
relations with the EU, above and beyond a free trade agreement. See 
especially my previous papers for the European Policy Centre, Brexit: Last call, 
4 July and Brexit: Beyond the transition, 21 August 2018. 
4 The Commission published its ‘no deal’ legislation on 19 December.  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6851_en.htm
5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu//media/37508/13-euco-art-50-conclusions-
en.pdf
6 Para. 3.
7 Para. 4. The word “independent” should also be dropped from para. 17. 
8 Paras 19 and 27. 
9 Paras 50-59. 
10 27,000 EU citizens came to the UK in the second quarter of 2018 and 30,000 
left. EU net migration turns negative, Financial Times, 29 November 2018.
11 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uks-future-skills-based-
immigration-system
12 Paras 29-39.
13 Paras 20-28.
14 This point is well made by Steve Peers, To Boldly Go? Analysis and annotation 
of the EU/UK Future Relationship declaration, 8 December.  
15 Para. 107. This marks disagreement about the terms of continued British 
participation in the Galileo programme. 
16 Para. 92.
17 Para. 124.
18 Insert: “Having regard to the Political Declaration on the future relationship 
between the European Union and the United Kingdom.” https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/publications/proposal-council-decision-conclusion-agreement-
withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-
union-and-european-atomic-energy-community_en
10
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